Contract Law: From Trust to Promise to Contract (HLS2X) | Unit 1: Complications and Quiz | More Complications

October 04, 2020

Contract Law: From Trust to Promise to Contract (HLS2X) | Unit 1: Complications and Quiz | More Complications | Brother-In-Law Part 2

October 4, 2020

Contract Law: From Trust to Promise to Contract (HLS2X)

Unit 1 | Complications and Quiz | More Complications | Brother-In-Law Part 2

Instructor Charles Fried, Beneficial Professor of Law:

My re-written lecture notes for Unit 1, Complications and Quiz – More Complications – Brother-In-Law Part 2 hyperlink: My Rewritten Brother-In-Law Part 2 Lecture Notes Hyperlink

In the Kirksey versus Kirksey case, if we applied the fourth (4^th) Contract Law principal type rules in our prima facie evidence test than is the Kirksey versus Kirksey case considered a gift or a bargain? And, in the Kirksey versus Kirksey case was there any quid-pro-quo?

In our Contact Law thus far we had applied our prima facie evidences test which we had studied and analyzed from our online lectures scientific law applications tutorial. And, which of these cases are most likely is similar to Kirksey versus Kirksey case are as follows:

1. Hamer (the Plaintiff [nephew]) versus Sidway (the Defendant [uncle]) in the Uncle Promise case,

2. Keller (the Defendant) versus Holderman (the Plaintiff) in the old silver watch case,

3. the Married man (the Defendant) versus his Mistress (the Plaintiff) in the Mr. Big case, or

4. Leonard (the Plaintiff) versus PepsiCo Inc (the Defendant) in the Pepsi point bottle caps advertisement commercial case for a Harrier Fighter Jet?

Well, we know for certain in the Kirksey versus Kirksey case was not similar to:

1. Keller (the Defendant) versus Holderman (the Plaintiff) in the old silver watch case because both parties who had coordinated an old silver watch transactional activity bargained was not meant to be either a purchase or a sale to either parties was decided by the Honorable Judge from both parties transactional activities was a frolic and a banter in a determination was meant, as a joke between parties;

2. the Married man (the Defendant) versus his Mistress (the Plaintiff) case because both parties had violated the third (3^rd) Contract Law principal type rule due to their extramarital affairs offered was decided by the Honorable Judge was an illegal and immoral acts and, the Judiciary System[s] does not stand behind any contract coordinated bargain-for-exchanges activities that led to those parties extramarital affair offers are considered a misdemeanors or felonies depending on the criminal prosecution codes in each States’ law of adultery statutes. Nevertheless, the Honorable Judge decided in the Married man (the Defendant) versus his Mistress (the Plaintiff) case was nothing more than a gift made to his (the Defendant [married man]) mistress (the Plaintiff); and

3. Leonard (the Plaintiff) versus PepsiCo Inc (the Defendant) in the Pepsi point bottle caps advertisement commercial case for a Harrier Fighter Jet was nothing more than a joke in which one (1) party should have not taken seriously because both parties had coordinated a bargain-for-exchange offer which led to their cooperation in trusts, promises, and commitments are real offers; only if, both parties have created a formal legal relation intents and, both parties must be serious about their coordinated bargain-for-exchange activities which led to one (1) another offer from the deciding Honorable Judge in the Leonard (the Plaintiff) versus PepsiCo Inc (the Defendant) case.

[1]

Well, in the Kirksey versus Kirksey case is nearly closest or similar to Hamer (the Plaintiff [nephew]) versus Sidway (the Defendant [uncle]) in which, the Honorable Judge had enforced Hamer (the Plaintiff [nephew]) payment of two-hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($250,000) paid from Sidway (the Defendant [uncle]) estate was a contract obligation and, not a promise to make a gift because Hamer (the Plaintiff [his nephew]) abided by Sidway’s (the Defendant’s [uncle]) agreements, in not to drink, smoke, swear or gamble that was really in Hamer (the Plaintiff [nephew]) own best interests. Now, Hamer (the Plaintiff [his nephew]) is living a clean and healthy lifestyle and, Sidway (the Defendant [uncle]) did not have to offer Hamer (the Plaintiff [his nephew]) any intrinsic value in type of monetary currencies incentive in a coordinated bargain-for-exchange offer of two-hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($250,000) payment to his nephew [Hamer] but Sidway (the Defendant [uncle]) had known Hamer (the Plaintiff [his nephew]) intrinsic value in type of monetary currencies incentive was a great motivational tool from Sidway (the Defendant [uncle]) offer agreements to Hamer (the Plaintiff [his nephew]) in order to stop Hamer (the Plaintiff [his nephew]) from drinking, smoking, swearing or gambling lifestyle until after his twenty-first (21^st) birthday.

[1]

So, likewise for Antillico (the Plaintiff [Sister-In-Law]) who had received similar incentive, as in the Hamer (the Plaintiff [nephew]) versus Sidway (the Defendant [uncle]) case and, Doe (the Defendant [Brother-In-Law]) had coordinated a bargain-for-exchange offer with Antillico (the Plaintiff [Sister-In-Law]) and her children to live gratuitously into Doe (the Defendant [Brother-In-Law]) extra farmhouse was Antillico (the Plaintiff [Sister-In-Law]) motivation. In an intrinsic value in a zero-based sum type with no monetary currencies exchanges offer to Doe (the Defendant [Brother-In-Law]) was enough for Antillico (the Plaintiff [Sister-In-Law]) and her children to pack up their personal belongings and, move to a better neighborhood and a nicer house were to her (Antillico [the Plaintiff]) advantage to do so, financially. However, Antillico (the Plaintiff [Sister-In-Law]) and her children did not have to move into Doe (the Defendant [Brother-In-Law]) extra farmhouse but Doe (the Defendant [Brother-In-Law]) had persisted that Antillico (the Plaintiff [Sister-In-Law]) and her children live on his (the Defendant [Brother-In-Law]) extra farmhouse.

[1]

Now, you would think, after, Doe (the Defendant [Brother-In-Law]) had forfeiture his gratuitously coordinated bargain-for-exchange housing offers to Antillico (the Plaintiff [Sister-In-Law]) and her children by ways of forcing her (the Plaintiff [Sister-In-Law]) with her children to move away from Doe (the Defendant [Brother-In-Law]) personal own properties that Antillico (the Plaintiff [Sister-In-Law]) should be able to sue Doe (the Defendant [Brother-In-Law]) because she (the Plaintiff [Sister-In-Law]) had relied on his (the Defendant [Brother-In-Law]) promise agreements.

Well, Antillico (the Plaintiff [Sister-In-Law]) did not win in her court litigation case against Doe (the Defendant [Brother-In-Law]). And, you may ask, why not?

The question, you should ask yourself, what are the differences between Doe (the Defendant [Brother-In-Law]) coordinated bargain-for-exchange offer received from Antillico (the Plaintiff [Sister-In-Law]), and Sidway (the Defendant [uncle]) coordinated bargain-for-exchange offer received from Hamer (the Plaintiff [his nephew])?

These differences between both cases in a coordinated bargain-for-exchanges received from the other parties offers were nothing in exchange bargains from either Antillico (the Plaintiff [Sister-In-Law]) or Hamer (the Plaintiff [nephew]) because Doe (the Defendant [Brother-In-Law]) coordinated a bargain-for-exchange with Antillico (the Plaintiff [Sister-In-Law]) was an intrinsic value measurements of unit type in a zero-based sum gratuitously offer type with no monetary currencies exchanges involved and, Sidway (the Defendant [uncle]) had coordinated a bargain-for-exchange with Hamer (the Plaintiff [his nephew]) on the basis of an intrinsic value measurements of unit type in monetary currencies exchange was worth, two-hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($250,000) and, those were the differences between both cases.

Please keep in mind, Antillico (the Plaintiff [Sister-In-Law]) and her children had moved out of their old house and she (Antillico [the Plaintiff]) had sold her old house at a financial loss and incurred other expenses during Antillico (the Plaintiff [Sister-In-Law]) and her children move to Doe (the Defendant [Brother-In-Law]) farmhouse on his (Doe [the Brother-In-Law]) property. In which, Antillico (the Plaintiff [Sister-In-Law]) moving into another area, she (Antillico [the Plaintiff]) did not had to do so. And, Doe (the Defendant [Brother-In-Law]) did not care one-way or the other, if, Antillico (the Plaintiff [Sister-In-Law]) and her children move into his (Doe [the Brother-In-Law]) farmhouse or not and, Doe (the Defendant [the Brother-In-Law]) surely did not want Antillico (the Plaintiff [Sister-In-Law]) and her children moving into his (Doe [the Brother-In-Law]) farmhouse with those incurred expenses. This is about Antillico (the Plaintiff [Sister-In-Law]) free will or free choice in her (Antillico [the Sister-In-Law]) personal decisions to sale and move away from her old house with her children. And, Antillico (the Plaintiff [Sister-In-Law]) obviously could not move into Doe (the Defendant [Brother-In-Law]) farmhouse without selling her old house first (1^st).

In the original Kirksey versus Kirksey case, Doe (the Defendant [Brother-In-Law]) had stated:

I will let you have a place to raise your family, and I have more open land than I can tend; and on the account of your (Antillico [the Sister-In-Law]) situation, and that of your family, I feel like I want you and the children to do well.

And, if Doe (the Defendant [Brother-In-Law]) did write in his letter to Antillico (the Plaintiff [Sister-In-Law]) that he (Doe [the Defendant]) will give Antillico (the Plaintiff [Sister-In-Law]) the deed to his (Doe [the Defendant]) farmhouse property than Doe (the Defendant [Brother-In-Law]) has the rights to change his mind later on, and nothing from their Contract offer is guarantee without a real coordinated bargain-for-exchange offers. Furthermore, if you look up the word “have” definition in the Merriam-Webster dictionary use in the original Kirksey versus Kirksey case’s letter and, the word have means in the Merriam-Webster dictionary:

· to hold in one’s use, service, regard or at one disposal.

And, Doe (the Defendant [Brother-In-Law]) had never written in his letter to Antillico (the Plaintiff [Sister-In-Law]) and, her family that she will permanently possess, own or hold Doe (the Defendant [Brother-In-Law]) farmhouse, as her personal farmhouse property in a deed like manner.

Therefore, if there are no real exchange bargains between parties, as in the Kirksey versus Kirksey case than Doe (the Defendant [Brother-In-Law]) coordinated a bargain-for-exchange was gratuitously offered, as a gift and not a bargain to Antillico (the Plaintiff [Sister-In-Law]) and, no Judiciary court system[s] or Honorable Judge[s] will not stand behind any gift litigation cases in any courthouse.