Sarai Hannah Ajai Unauthorized Mobile Number Transfer (“Port-Out”) / Account Takeover Attempt

Sarai Hannah Ajai Unauthorized Mobile Number Transfer (“Port-Out”) / Account Takeover Attempt

What happened:

On September 21, 2025, my Verizon line ending in the last two digits number 95 abruptly lost service on my iPhone 11. When I called Verizon support from my other Verizon line ending in the two digits number 65, the automated system stated that my Verizon account ending in the last two digits number, 95 “no longer exists with this carrier.” I did not request any change to my account. Shortly thereafter, service ending in the last two digits number, 95 reappeared on my device without any action from me. This sequence is consistent with an unauthorized transfer (port-out) or SIM-swap–type event and a potential mobile account-takeover attempt.

Timeline (Central Time):

• ~5:18 AM: A male voice outside my apartment (individual known in the complex only as “Larry”) yelled disturbing statements asserting control; I have no relationship with him.

• ~12:30 PM: Verizon line ending in the last two digits number, 95 lost service. Verizon IVR, when called from my other Verizon account ending in the last two digits number, 65, reported the number no longer existed with Verizon.

• Shortly after ~12:30 PM: Service for my Verizon account ending in the two digits number, 95 was restored without my authorization.

Why this matters / harms and risks:

A transient port-out or SIM change can allow criminals to intercept calls and texts, including one-time passcodes for bank, email, and government accounts. This exposes me to identity thefts, financial losses, and account compromises. The fact that the number briefly ceased to exist with my Verizon account and then returned suggests an unauthorized change that should not be possible without strong authentication.

Pattern / context:

I have experienced impersonation concerns originating around my apartment complex over tenants in recent years (no personal relationships with the individuals involved). This may be relevant to mobile-number fraud from either cloning and mirroring my Verizon account with a share eSIMs with tenants activities without my legal consents and authorizations.

Steps taken:

I contacted Verizon immediately. I have not authorized any port-out, SIM/eSIM change, device swap, or account modification for my Verizon account ending in the last two digits number, 95.

Requested action / relief:

1. Record this report in Consumer Sentinel and share with relevant agencies.

2. Encourage/require Verizon to implement and honor strong anti-port-out controls (Number Lock/Port Freeze, mandatory Port-Out PIN, robust in-store verification) and to maintain adequate security to prevent unauthorized transfers.

3. Require Verizon to provide me, in writing:

• Confirmation of any port-out/port-in/SIM/eSIM/device changes or temporary carrier-of-record changes on 9/21/2025 (exact CT/UTC timestamps).

• Audit logs: account notes, tickets, authorization method used (PIN, OTP, in-store), originating IPs or store/rep IDs, and any receiving-carrier data (including NPAC references).

4. Require Verizon to lock down all lines on my account (Number Lock/Do-Not-Port flags), reset and secure my Account PIN/Port-Out PIN, and confirm a fraud case number and point of contact.

5. Preserve all logs and evidence related to my account activity on and around 9/21/2025.

Declaration:

I am the lawful subscriber for my Verizon account, ending in the last two digits number, 95. I did not authorize any port-out or account change on 9/21/2025. I consent to sharing this complaint with Verizon and appropriate authorities to investigate and remediate.

Attachments photograph is my legal evidence:

• Screenshot(s) or call log showing the time of the support call from my Verizon account ending in the last two digits number, 65.