Sarai Hannah Ajai CEO | Incident Report: Unauthorized Deletion of routes/mailboxRoutes.js Observed in GitHub Dashboard

Incident Report: Unauthorized Deletion of routes/mailboxRoutes.js Observed in GitHub Dashboard 

Summary

On January 12, 2026 at approximately 9:15 AM (America/Chicago), a critical application route file — routes/mailboxRoutes.js — was observed as deleted in the GitHub repository activity/dashboard while testing the login workflow. This file supports core VaultInbox compose/draft behavior, including CSRF protection sequencing, PDF upload handling, and database persistence to mail_items. The deletion created an immediate risk of application breakage, security exposure, and loss of operational continuity.

This report documents what was observed, the scope of impact, likely causes, evidence to preserve, and recommended containment and recovery actions.

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Incident Details

Date/Time (Local)

• January 12, 2026
• ~9:15 AM (America/Chicago)

Reporter

• Sarai Hannah Ajai

System / Repository

• Project: VaultInbox_0.0.1a
• File involved: routes/mailboxRoutes.js
• Platform: GitHub
• Local environment referenced: Apple Mac Mini M1

What Happened

While testing the login page (entering user email + password), the GitHub dashboard showed that routes/mailboxRoutes.js was deleted. The deletion was not expected during routine login testing and was detected as a sudden change occurring during normal development activity.

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Impact Assessment

Severity

• High (core routing + security + compose workflow affected)

Functional Impact

If routes/mailboxRoutes.js is missing, likely outcomes include:

• /compose route failures (GET/POST)
• Draft creation failure and inability to post to mail_items
• Loss of CSRF ordering logic (multer → csurf) and associated protections
• Potential inability to upload/store PDFs correctly
• Potential breakage of “Start New Draft” behavior and lock-state enforcement

Security Impact

• Unauthorized deletion suggests potential compromise of:
• GitHub credentials/session
• Git credentials on local machine (PAT/SSH key)
• Any automation with repository write access (CI/CD tokens, GitHub Actions)
• A hostile actor could modify routes to bypass authentication/CSRF, alter pricing, exfiltrate data, or weaken audit trails.

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Evidence to Preserve (Do Not Modify)

Preserve these items before heavy troubleshooting:

GitHub Evidence

• The commit SHA that deleted the file
• Commit author and committer identity
• Whether the deletion was “via GitHub” (web UI) or pushed from a device
• GitHub Security Log entries around ~9:15 AM CT
• List of active PATs, SSH keys, and OAuth app authorizations

Local Evidence

• Output of:
• git status
• git log --oneline -- routes/mailboxRoutes.js
• git reflog
• Local shell history (if available)
• Any local security alerts / unusual processes

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Suspected Causes (Preliminary)

This incident requires verification. Plausible causes include:

1. Accidental local deletion + commit
• File removed locally, committed unintentionally, then pushed.
2. GitHub UI deletion
• File removed directly in GitHub (still creates a commit).
3. Credential compromise
• An unauthorized party used GitHub credentials, PAT, or SSH keys to push a deletion commit.
4. Automation / workflow modification
• GitHub Actions or a bot account with write access made the change.

At this stage, cause is unconfirmed until the commit and security logs are reviewed.

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Immediate Containment Actions (Recommended)

These steps reduce damage and prevent repeated deletion:

1) Account Security

• Change GitHub password immediately
• Ensure 2FA is enabled
• Revoke any unfamiliar PATs
• Remove unfamiliar SSH keys
• Review authorized OAuth apps and revoke unknown ones

2) Repository Protection

• Protect the default branch:
• Require pull requests
• Block force-push
• Require review approvals (even 1 is enough for now)

3) Local Git Credential Hygiene

• Rotate or delete stored Git credentials if uncertain
• If using SSH: regenerate SSH keys and re-add to GitHub
• If using PAT: rotate the token and store securely

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Recovery Actions Taken / Planned

Restore routes/mailboxRoutes.js

One of the following recovery paths should be executed:

• Restore locally if not committed:
• git restore routes/mailboxRoutes.js
• Restore from last known good commit:
• git checkout <GOOD_COMMIT_SHA> -- routes/mailboxRoutes.js
• git commit -m "Restore mailboxRoutes.js"
• git push

Verification After Restore

• Confirm the file exists locally and on GitHub
• Run the server and verify:
• GET /compose renders
• POST /compose inserts into mail_items
• CSRF + session behavior works
• PDF moves correctly and is cleaned up on failure paths

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Lessons Learned / Prevention

• Enable branch protections to prevent direct destructive pushes
• Require PR review for route/security files
• Consider signed commits for accountability
• Maintain nightly local backup or automated repo mirror
• Keep a “critical paths” checklist for routes handling auth, CSRF, uploads, and payments

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Incident Status

• Status: Open (needs commit attribution + security log verification)
• Next Required Evidence:
• Commit SHA for deletion event
• GitHub Security Log entries around Jan 12, 2026 ~9:15 AM CT
• Confirmation whether change originated via GitHub UI or device push