Sarai Hannah Ajai's TECHNICAL INCIDENT REPORT - Suspected Unauthorized Computer Access, SQLite3 Database Interference, Development-System Interference, and Potential Account Compromise
VAULTINBOX.CLOUD
TECHNICAL INCIDENT REPORT
Suspected Unauthorized Computer Access, SQLite3 Database Interference, Development-System Interference, and Potential Account Compromise
REDATED
Incident Date: August 7, 2026
Computer: Apple Mac mini M1
Operating Environment: macOS
Application: VaultInbox.Cloud
Development Environment: Visual Studio Code
Database: SQLite3 / DB Browser for SQLite
Application Stack: Node.js / Express / EJS / SQLite3
Payment Environment: Stripe Sandbox/Test
External Development Tunnel: ngrok
Local Application Endpoint: http://localhost:3000
Public Development Host: 81994e82d3da.ngrok.app
Documented Stripe Webhook Path: /billing/webhook
Incident Classification: Suspected unauthorized computer or account access; suspected interference with development data; reported disappearance or deletion of SQLite3 database information; potential credential exposure; preservation of digital evidence required.
1. PURPOSE OF INCIDENT REPORT
I am documenting a suspected computer-security and database incident discovered on August 7, 2026 while I was actively developing, testing, and preparing a presentation of the VaultInbox.Cloud software application on my Apple Mac mini M1.
During the development session, VaultInbox.Cloud was operating through a local Node.js development server using port 3000. An ngrok HTTPS tunnel was being used to make specific development routes accessible for external testing, including Stripe Sandbox webhook processing.
Throughout the afternoon, VaultInbox.Cloud successfully performed multiple database-dependent operations. These included:
- user registration;
- email verification;
- login verification;
- authenticated user sessions;
- generation of security notifications;
- Certified Delivery draft creation;
- generation and storage of a UUID tracking identifier;
- recipient association;
- Certified Delivery transmission;
- Inbox retrieval;
- recipient MFA/TOTP authentication; and
- Certified Delivery unlock processing.
Contemporaneous screenshots and VaultInbox.Cloud-generated email records document these operations.
I subsequently discovered what I report as the disappearance or deletion of database information that had previously existed within the VaultInbox.Cloud SQLite3 development environment and had been used by the application during testing.
I did not knowingly authorize another person to delete, modify, replace, reset, or otherwise interfere with the relevant VaultInbox.Cloud database information.
I suspect unauthorized access or interference and have identified Ly, R*l*n*i* B*k*r, and potentially other tenants as persons whose possible involvement I believe should be investigated based upon circumstances and other incidents I have separately documented.
However, the evidence presently attached to this report does not independently establish which person performed any database operation or whether the database condition resulted specifically from an Apple/iCloud compromise. Attribution should therefore be determined through examination of the computer, database artifacts, account records, network records, application logs, and other forensic evidence.
2. VAULTINBOX.CLOUD DEVELOPMENT CONFIGURATION
At approximately 5:23 PM CDT on August 7, 2026, Visual Studio Code was open on the Apple Mac mini M1 with the VaultInbox.Cloud .env configuration displayed.
The screenshot documents the following development configuration:
Base URL
Application Base URL
Public Development URL
https://81994e82d3da.ngrok.app
The WebAuthn development configuration was also associated with the same ngrok hostname.
This establishes that VaultInbox.Cloud was operating locally through:
localhost:3000
while ngrok provided an externally reachable HTTPS development address.
The architecture being tested was therefore generally:
Internet/Test Service → ngrok HTTPS endpoint → VaultInbox.Cloud local Node.js application → localhost:3000 → application/database processing
3. STRIPE SANDBOX WEBHOOK CONFIGURATION
Between approximately 5:18 PM and 5:22 PM CDT, I configured the VaultInbox.Cloud Stripe Sandbox event destination.
The screenshots document selection of the following four Stripe Checkout events:
checkout.session.async_payment_failed
checkout.session.async_payment_succeeded
checkout.session.completed
checkout.session.expired
The Stripe destination type was:
Webhook endpoint
The endpoint entered into Stripe was:
https://81994e82d3da.ngrok.app/billing/webhook
The destination was named:
VaultInbox Checkout Webhooks (Test)
The description entered into Stripe stated:
VaultInbox pay-as-you-go Checkout webhooks for updating mail_items when payment completes/expires (test via ngrok).
At approximately 5:22 PM, Stripe displayed the destination as:
Active
The documented payment-event path was therefore:
Stripe Sandbox → ngrok HTTPS endpoint → /billing/webhook → VaultInbox.Cloud application → localhost port 3000
The configuration is significant because the application was being actively integrated with an external development service during the same period in which VaultInbox.Cloud application and database functions were being tested.
4. VAULTINBOX.CLOUD APPLICATION AND DATABASE ACTIVITY
The screenshots and subsequently preserved email records provide multiple independent records that VaultInbox.Cloud was processing structured application information during the afternoon of August 7, 2026.
These records are important because they establish that the application was functioning before I discovered the reported database condition.
They do not, standing alone, prove the existence of every individual SQLite3 table. They do, however, document application operations that depended upon structured account, authentication, recipient, Certified Delivery, tracking, and session-related information.
5. PAIGE TURNER TEST ACCOUNT — REGISTRATION AND VERIFICATION
At 5:29 PM, VaultInbox.Cloud generated an email-verification communication addressed to:
The communication states:
“Verify Your Email”
and instructs Paige to use a verification code to verify the email address for VaultInbox.Cloud.
This establishes contemporaneous application activity associated with the Paige Turner test account.
At 5:30 PM, VaultInbox.Cloud generated a login verification code for the same account.
Also at 5:30 PM, VaultInbox.Cloud generated a “Welcome aboard” communication addressed to Paige.
The system expressly stated:
“Your email has been verified successfully. Your VaultInbox account is ready to use.”
The combination of these records documents a coherent account workflow:
registration → email-verification communication → successful verification → account-ready state.
6. PAIGE TURNER AUTHENTICATED LOGIN ACTIVITY
At approximately 5:31 PM, VaultInbox.Cloud generated a new-login notification for the Paige Turner test account.
The record states:
Time: August 7, 2026, 5:31 PM, America/Chicago
IP: 146.75.192.1
The recorded device information identifies a Macintosh/Safari user-agent environment.
Later, at approximately 5:50 PM, VaultInbox.Cloud generated another six-digit login verification code for Paige.
A corresponding new-login notification records another Paige account login at approximately 5:50 PM, again recording an IP address and Macintosh/Safari user-agent information.
The previously preserved browser screenshot from approximately 5:50 PM also displays the VaultInbox.Cloud route:
/auth/login/otp
with the login-verification interface active.
These independent records are consistent with a functioning authentication workflow during that period.
7. ETHAN WHITAKER TEST ACCOUNT — REGISTRATION AND VERIFICATION
The VaultInbox.Cloud evidence documents a similar account sequence for:
ethan.whitaker@ivoteballot.com
At approximately 5:36 PM, VaultInbox.Cloud generated an email-verification communication for Ethan.
At approximately 5:37 PM, VaultInbox.Cloud generated a login verification code for the Ethan account.
Also at approximately 5:37 PM, VaultInbox.Cloud generated a “Welcome aboard” communication stating that Ethan's email had been successfully verified and that the VaultInbox account was ready to use.
At approximately 5:40 PM, the application generated a new-login notification for Ethan.
The notification records:
Time: August 7, 2026, 5:40 PM, America/Chicago
IP: 146.75.192.1
and identifies a Macintosh/Safari user-agent environment.
These records provide additional contemporaneous evidence of functioning VaultInbox.Cloud account and authentication processing.
8. CERTIFIED DELIVERY DRAFT CREATION
At approximately 5:45 PM, VaultInbox.Cloud generated a system communication addressed to Ethan with the subject:
VaultInbox • Draft saved • 67328f94
The record identifies:
Tracking ID
67328f94-2768-432f-b7b9-09d862f0cc36
Recipient
Subject
Testing
The communication additionally states that the Recipient Unlock Code was intentionally excluded from the email and should be accessed only inside the authenticated VaultInbox session.
This record is significant because it documents a relationship among:
sender → draft → tracking UUID → recipient → subject → authenticated VaultInbox session.
9. CERTIFIED DELIVERY TRANSMISSION
At approximately 5:47 PM, only approximately two minutes after the documented draft confirmation, VaultInbox.Cloud generated a:
“New secure delivery”
notification addressed to Paige.
The email identifies:
Sender
ethan.whitaker@ivoteballot.com
and:
Tracking ID
67328f94-2768-432f-b7b9-09d862f0cc36
This is the same tracking identifier appearing in the sender's 5:45 PM draft confirmation.
Accordingly, two separate VaultInbox.Cloud-generated communications document the same transaction from different application perspectives:
Sender-side record: Ethan → Paige → Draft → UUID.
Recipient-side record: Paige → New Secure Delivery → Ethan → same UUID.
This correspondence is important evidence of the operational state of the Certified Delivery system before the reported database problem was discovered.
10. VAULTINBOX INBOX — DATABASE-DEPENDENT DELIVERY RETRIEVAL
At approximately 5:57 PM, the preserved browser screenshots show the authenticated VaultInbox.Cloud Inbox.
The Inbox contained a delivery displaying:
Tracking ID:
67328f94-2768-432f-b7b9-09d862f0cc36
From:
ethan.whitaker@ivoteballot.com
Subject:
Testing
Status:
sent
Sent (CST):
2026-08-07 17:47:09
The Inbox page itself states that inbound deliveries are addressed to the account email and matched using:
deliveries.recipient_email
This browser evidence corresponds directly with the email evidence.
The same UUID therefore appears across:
sender draft confirmation → recipient delivery notification → authenticated VaultInbox Inbox.
This correlation is technically significant because it demonstrates that the application was retrieving the Certified Delivery record through its normal user interface.
11. CERTIFIED DELIVERY OPENING
At approximately 6:00 PM, the delivery was accessed through the route:
/inbox/open/353ef201-c3ee-4358-b4ef-56b064056257
The application displayed:
Unlock Certified Delivery
The screen displayed the previously documented tracking identifier and identified Ethan as the sender.
The application further stated that:
Recipient 2FA using an Authenticator App (TOTP)
was required.
The recipient was required to authenticate before the delivery could proceed to the sender-provided 16-character unlock code.
This documents continued access to the delivery after its earlier draft creation and transmission.
12. RECIPIENT MFA/TOTP AUTHENTICATION
At approximately 6:12 PM, VaultInbox.Cloud displayed the route:
/auth/mfa/verify?next=...
The interface stated:
“This delivery requires Authenticator verification before it can be opened.”
At approximately 6:13 PM, VaultInbox.Cloud displayed:
/auth/mfa/enroll?next=...
with the:
Set up your Authenticator App
workflow.
The interface displayed a QR code, manual setup key, six-digit confirmation field, and Confirm & Enable control.
At approximately 6:16 PM, the application again displayed the Two-Factor Authentication verification interface.
At approximately 6:27 PM, VaultInbox.Cloud returned to:
/inbox/open/353ef201-c3ee-4358-b4ef-56b064056257
and displayed:
Status: Verified
The interface then permitted continuation to the sender's 16-character unlock-code stage.
This provides additional evidence that the application continued processing authentication and Certified Delivery state after the earlier account and delivery operations.
13. CONTINUED ETHAN ACCOUNT ACTIVITY
The email evidence extends the documented application activity beyond the 6:27 PM recipient-authentication screenshot.
At approximately 6:33 PM, VaultInbox.Cloud generated another login verification code for Ethan.
At approximately 6:34 PM, VaultInbox.Cloud generated a corresponding new-login notification.
The notification records:
Time: August 7, 2026, 6:34 PM, America/Chicago
IP: 146.75.192.150
and records a Macintosh/Safari user-agent environment.
The significance of these records is that VaultInbox.Cloud continued producing account-security events after the Certified Delivery MFA workflow documented at approximately 6:27 PM.
14. CONSOLIDATED TECHNICAL TIMELINE
The contemporaneous evidence presently establishes the following sequence:
Approx. Time | Documented Activity |
5:18 PM | Stripe Checkout webhook events selected |
5:18 PM | Stripe Webhook Endpoint selected |
5:21 PM | Stripe event destination configured |
5:22 PM | Stripe webhook destination displayed as Active |
5:23 PM | VaultInbox .env, localhost:3000, and ngrok configuration documented |
5:29 PM | Paige email-verification communication generated |
5:30 PM | Paige login verification generated |
5:30 PM | Paige account reported successfully verified |
5:31 PM | Paige new-login event recorded |
5:36 PM | Ethan email-verification communication generated |
5:37 PM | Ethan login verification generated |
5:37 PM | Ethan account reported successfully verified |
5:40 PM | Ethan new-login event recorded |
5:45 PM | Certified Delivery draft saved with UUID |
5:47 PM | Secure Delivery sent to Paige using same UUID |
5:50 PM | Paige login verification and login documented |
5:57 PM | Paige Inbox retrieves Certified Delivery |
6:00 PM | Certified Delivery unlock interface displayed |
6:12 PM | Recipient MFA verification required |
6:13 PM | Authenticator enrollment interface displayed |
6:16 PM | MFA verification interface displayed |
6:27 PM | Recipient authentication displayed as Verified |
6:33 PM | Ethan login verification generated |
6:34 PM | Ethan new-login event recorded |
7:32–7:33 PM | Stripe Sandbox/development environment documented |
The chronology demonstrates sustained VaultInbox.Cloud activity over more than one hour.
15. REPORTED SQLITE3 DATABASE INCIDENT
After the above application operations, I discovered what I report as a significant change in the VaultInbox.Cloud SQLite3 development database when working with DB Browser for SQLite.
I report that database information and tables that I expected to be present based upon the previously functioning development environment were no longer available as expected.
Before making any intentional database reset or reconstruction, I had been using the database to support the VaultInbox.Cloud development and presentation-testing activities documented above.
I did not knowingly authorize Ly, R*l*n*i* B*k*r, another tenant, or another third party to access or modify the VaultInbox.Cloud SQLite3 database.
I further did not knowingly authorize another person to access my:
- Apple Mac mini M1;
- Apple/iCloud account;
- VaultInbox.Cloud development files;
- SQLite3 database;
- DB Browser for SQLite environment;
- Visual Studio Code environment;
- VaultInbox.Cloud source code;
- Stripe development account;
- ngrok development configuration;
- authentication credentials;
- email credentials; or
- VaultInbox.Cloud test-user information.
The exact technical cause of the database condition remains to be determined.
16. SUSPECTED UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS AND PERSONS IDENTIFIED FOR INVESTIGATION
Based upon circumstances outside the technical screenshots and email records, together with incidents I have separately documented, I suspect that Larry, Ralencia Baker, and potentially other tenants may have been involved in unauthorized monitoring of or interference with my computer systems, accounts, or development work.
I am identifying these individuals as persons whose possible involvement should be investigated.
The submitted VaultInbox.Cloud emails and application screenshots do not independently identify these individuals as the source of a database operation.
I therefore request that attribution be determined through technical and forensic evidence.
I further report that I believe the suspected conduct may be connected with continuing harassment and discriminatory or sexually coercive conduct that I have previously reported, including conduct that I believe concerns my sex and my refusal to participate in unwanted sexual activity.
This alleged motive is part of my report and should be investigated independently. It is not established by the technical screenshots or VaultInbox.Cloud email records themselves.
17. TECHNICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EMAIL EVIDENCE
The newly preserved email evidence materially supplements the screenshots because it provides timestamped application-generated records independent of the browser screenshots.
The evidence documents:
Account creation and verification
Paige and Ethan both received verification communications and subsequent account-ready confirmations.
Authentication processing
Both test accounts generated login verification and new-login records.
Certified Delivery creation
The sender received a draft confirmation containing the recipient, subject, and UUID tracking identifier.
Certified Delivery transmission
The recipient received a secure-delivery notification identifying the sender and the exact same UUID.
This evidence supports the conclusion that VaultInbox.Cloud possessed and processed structured application information before the subsequently reported SQLite3 database condition.
18. EVIDENTIARY LIMITATION AND ATTRIBUTION
For accuracy, this report distinguishes between what the preserved evidence demonstrates and what remains under investigation.
The evidence demonstrates that VaultInbox.Cloud was processing account, authentication, recipient, delivery, tracking, and MFA-related information on August 7, 2026.
The evidence also demonstrates that the same Certified Delivery UUID was maintained across multiple application operations.
The screenshots and email PDFs alone do not establish:
- the complete SQLite schema existing at every relevant timestamp;
- the precise time at which database information subsequently disappeared;
- the SQL statement or process responsible;
- whether a database file was deleted, replaced, emptied, corrupted, or whether another database file was opened;
- whether the operation originated locally or remotely;
- whether an Apple/iCloud account was compromised; or
- the identity of the person responsible.
Those issues should be determined through forensic examination.
19. REQUESTED FORENSIC INVESTIGATION
I request preservation and examination, where legally and technically available, of evidence capable of determining the origin of the reported database condition.
The investigation should specifically examine:
SQLite evidence: original .db, .sqlite, or .sqlite3 files; -wal; -shm; rollback journals; schema metadata; database modification timestamps; DB Browser recent-file information; and recoverable SQLite pages.
macOS evidence: filesystem timestamps; login records; process execution records; shell history; application logs; security logs; user-account activity; remote-access configuration; and relevant system logs.
VaultInbox.Cloud evidence: Node.js logs; Express request logs; authentication logs; security-audit records; session records; database initialization code; migrations; seed scripts; development utilities; and any route capable of modifying database records.
Development evidence: Visual Studio Code Timeline/history; Git status; Git commits; source-code changes; terminal history; npm scripts; and filesystem changes.
External service evidence: ngrok request/session records and Stripe Sandbox webhook/event-delivery records.
Apple account evidence: Apple account authentication activity, trusted devices, active sessions, security notifications, and other account-access records available through Apple.
The investigation should determine:
Who or what process performed the relevant database operation?
When did it occur?
What SQL or filesystem operation occurred?
Did the operation originate through VaultInbox.Cloud code, DB Browser, Terminal, another local application, or remote access?
Was the database deleted, replaced, reset, emptied, corrupted, or was a different database file opened?
Was an unauthorized operating-system or Apple account session present?
Can any device, IP address, account, process, or individual be technically associated with the operation?
20. DIGITAL EVIDENCE PRESERVATION STATEMENT
The original screenshots and PDF email records should be maintained in their original electronic formats.
Copies may be created for submission, but the originals should not be overwritten, re-exported, annotated, or modified.
The following should also be preserved before rebuilding the development database:
the current SQLite database file; any WAL/SHM/journal files; the entire database directory; VaultInbox.Cloud logs; terminal history; Git repository state; .env configuration; DB Browser configuration/history; and relevant macOS logs.
A working copy of the project should be used for subsequent development so that the evidence copy remains unchanged.
Where possible, cryptographic SHA-256 hashes should be generated for the preserved evidence files to document their state at the time of preservation.
21. SECURITY CREDENTIAL EXPOSURE
The approximately 5:23 PM screenshot contains sensitive VaultInbox.Cloud development configuration information.
Accordingly, any credentials visible in that screenshot should be treated as exposed.
After preserving the screenshot as evidence, affected credentials should be rotated, including as applicable:
Stripe test secret credentials; Stripe webhook signing secret; SMTP credentials; session secret; application encryption/authentication secrets; and development authentication/bypass values.
Existing sessions should be invalidated where appropriate after the relevant session credentials are changed.
This security response should occur without altering the preserved original screenshot.
22. FORMAL INCIDENT STATEMENT
I am documenting that VaultInbox.Cloud was demonstrably functioning during the afternoon of August 7, 2026 with test-user accounts, email verification, login verification, authenticated sessions, Certified Delivery creation, recipient association, UUID tracking, secure-delivery notification, Inbox retrieval, and recipient MFA authentication.
Contemporaneous VaultInbox.Cloud-generated email records corroborate significant portions of the browser activity.
The sender-side draft confirmation identifies tracking UUID:
67328f94-2768-432f-b7b9-09d862f0cc36
together with recipient paige.turner@ivoteballot.com and subject Testing.
The recipient-side secure-delivery notification subsequently identifies sender ethan.whitaker@ivoteballot.com and the exact same tracking UUID.
The preserved application screenshots then display that same delivery through the authenticated VaultInbox.Cloud Inbox and Certified Delivery workflow.
I subsequently discovered what I report as missing or deleted information within the SQLite3 development environment.
I did not knowingly authorize another person to perform such an operation.
I suspect unauthorized access or interference and request investigation into whether Ly, R*l*n*i* B*k*r, other tenants, or another person or process was responsible. I am not representing that the currently preserved screenshots and emails, standing alone, establish the identity of the responsible party.
I request preservation and forensic examination of the relevant digital evidence so that the database state, time of alteration, technical mechanism, source, and responsible account, device, process, or individual can be determined objectively.
23. Evidence Status
At this point, I would classify my evidence into three distinct levels:
Documented: VaultInbox.Cloud accounts, verification events, logins, Certified Delivery creation, UUID tracking, recipient association, Inbox retrieval, MFA processing, localhost/ngrok configuration, and Stripe webhook configuration.
Reported observation: the SQLite3 database/table information subsequently was no longer present as expected in DB Browser for SQLite.
Requires forensic determination: exactly what changed the database, when the change occurred, whether unauthorized access occurred, and who was responsible.
That structure is important. It allows me to document my allegation fully without presenting an unverified attribution as a technical conclusion. The email records make the pre-incident operational timeline considerably stronger.
Comments
Post a Comment