Sarai Hannah Ajai's PUBLIC-REDACTED CONSOLIDATED APPLE IPHONE 17 SCREEN TIME PASSCODE, APPLE ACCOUNT SECURITY, AND VERIZON ORBIC RC400L / EFF RAYHUNTER INCIDENT REPORT
PUBLIC-REDACTED CONSOLIDATED APPLE IPHONE 17 SCREEN TIME PASSCODE, APPLE ACCOUNT SECURITY, AND VERIZON ORBIC RC400L / EFF RAYHUNTER INCIDENT REPORT
Reporting Individual / Complainant: Sarai Hannah Ajai
Primary Incident Date: Saturday, October 17, 2026
Related Previous Incident Date: Wednesday, October 14, 2026
Report Preparation Date: October 17, 2026
Primary Device: Apple iPhone 17
Secondary Device: Verizon Orbic RC400L Mobile Hotspot
Reported Specialized Software Configuration: Electronic Frontier Foundation Rayhunter — cellular-network monitoring and IMSI-catcher detection
Relevant Accounts and Systems: Apple Account/iCloud; Apple Screen Time; Screen Time Passcode Recovery; Verizon mobile hotspot; Wi-Fi connectivity; Apple authentication; Family Sharing; cellular-network monitoring
Supporting Evidence: Exhibits A1, A2, B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, and C1
Document Classification: Private Technical Incident Report, Evidentiary Review, and Request for Independent Investigation
I. PURPOSE OF THIS INCIDENT REPORT
I, Sarai Hannah Ajai ("Complainant"), prepare this consolidated incident report to document another Screen Time passcode irregularity affecting my personally owned Apple iPhone 17 on October 17, 2026.
The reported incident follows a Screen Time credential change that I personally performed on October 14, 2026.
The incident also involves my examination of a Verizon Orbic RC400L mobile hotspot, which I previously configured, or attempted to configure, using software associated with the Electronic Frontier Foundation's Rayhunter project.
I am concerned about possible unauthorized account access, unexpected wireless-network connections, and the integrity of my personally controlled authentication settings.
I request an independent technical examination of these matters.
This report separately identifies:
- Actions I personally performed.
- Screenshots and photographs retained as evidence.
- Information visible in device interfaces.
- Technical characteristics established through public project documentation.
- Statements derived from my prior account history.
- Concerns requiring additional verification.
- Conclusions that cannot presently be established.
I do not intend this report to attribute unauthorized access or criminal activity to a particular individual without adequate evidence.
II. PERSONAL OWNERSHIP AND AUTHORIZATION
I personally own and use the Apple iPhone 17 involved in this incident.
I also use the associated Apple Account and personally controlled authentication credentials.
I operate or possess a Verizon Orbic RC400L device.
I have not knowingly authorized neighboring tenants, unrelated individuals, property-management personnel, or other third parties to change my Screen Time passcode, access my Apple Account, modify trusted-device settings, or administer my iPhone remotely.
I have not knowingly shared my Apple Account password with any person whom I suspect of unauthorized activity.
I also report that I have not enrolled family members in Apple Family Sharing.
These statements concern my authorization. They do not establish that any particular unauthorized access occurred.
III. OCTOBER 14, 2026, APPROXIMATELY 6:14 P.M. — INTENTIONAL SCREEN TIME PASSCODE CHANGE
On Wednesday, October 14, 2026, at approximately 6:14 p.m., I intentionally established the four-digit Screen Time passcode:
XXXX
I personally selected this credential.
After completing the configuration process, I understood XXXX to be my valid Screen Time passcode.
I did not knowingly authorize any other person to modify this credential after I established it.
The October 14 change is based on my personal recollection and previous documentation.
The eight exhibits submitted for October 17 do not independently demonstrate the October 14 configuration event.
IV. OCTOBER 17, 2026, APPROXIMATELY 12:34 P.M. — REPORTED PASSCODE DISCREPANCY
On Saturday, October 17, 2026, at approximately 12:34 p.m., I experienced another problem concerning the Screen Time credential on my iPhone 17.
I report that the passcode configuration differed from the previously established four-digit credential, XXXX.
The four-digit value associated with the October 17 discrepancy was:
XXXX
My account is that I had not knowingly authorized another individual to change the credential from XXXX.
I considered the discrepancy abnormal because I expected the passcode I previously established to remain valid until I intentionally changed it.
However, the submitted screenshots do not independently establish when the passcode state changed, whether the credential was actually altered by another person, or whether a technical or account-configuration condition explains the discrepancy.
The distinction between my recollection and independently verifiable device activity must be preserved.
V. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO FOUR-DIGIT CREDENTIALS
The credential values relevant to my account are:
Credential event | Four-digit value |
October 14, 2026 — personally established Screen Time passcode | XXXX |
October 17, 2026 — credential associated with reported discrepancy | XXXX |
October 17, approximately 1:51 p.m. — subsequently established passcode | Not supplied for this report |
The historical passcodes are included at my express request.
Their inclusion does not establish that another individual knew either credential.
If either historical credential is used for any other account, system, or security setting, it should be changed.
The newly established Screen Time passcode is not reproduced because its numerical value is unavailable in the submitted information.
VI. OCTOBER 17, APPROXIMATELY 12:45 P.M. — APPLE ACCOUNT PASSWORD CHANGE
At approximately 12:45 p.m. on October 17, 2026, I intentionally changed the password associated with my Apple Account/iCloud account.
I personally performed this action.
I did not knowingly provide the new password to neighboring tenants, unrelated persons, or other individuals whom I had not authorized to access my account.
I was concerned that recurring Screen Time passcode problems might involve account-security conditions requiring investigation.
The submitted exhibits do not independently verify the exact password-change timestamp.
I request that the event be corroborated through available Apple security notifications or account records.
For security reasons, my actual Apple Account password is not reproduced in this report.
VII. VERIZON ORBIC RC400L DEVICE AND ITS ORIGINAL FUNCTION
The Verizon Orbic RC400L is a mobile hotspot designed to provide cellular-network connectivity and Wi-Fi access for compatible client devices.
In conventional hotspot operation, the device maintains a cellular-network connection and makes that connectivity available to authorized wireless clients.
Its Wi-Fi connection functions separately from its cellular modem's network registration and signaling.
For example, a device can display a Wi-Fi network name even when the hotspot does not currently have usable cellular internet service.
An Orbic connected-client count, when accurately retrieved, describes Wi-Fi client associations rather than the number of cellular identities being monitored.
These distinctions are relevant to my October 17 observations.
VIII. PRIOR REPORTED CONFIGURATION FOR EFF RAYHUNTER
I previously described configuring my Verizon Orbic RC400L using software or algorithms associated with the Electronic Frontier Foundation's GitHub project.
I referred to the resulting configuration as a "Ray and Stimulators Hunter" device.
The publicly documented technology corresponding to this description is EFF Rayhunter.
Rayhunter is an open-source program designed to examine selected cellular-modem diagnostic information for behaviors potentially associated with IMSI catchers or cell-site simulators.
Such devices can imitate certain functions of legitimate cellular-network equipment.
Rayhunter performs passive monitoring and heuristic analysis of cellular signaling observed by the supported modem.
The Orbic RC400L is a supported hardware platform for this software.
My earlier descriptions indicate that I intended to use the Orbic as a cellular-network security monitoring device.
However, the exact installation procedure I performed, the date of installation, the installed Rayhunter version, and whether the application was functioning properly on October 17 have not been independently verified through configuration or diagnostic records.
I request that those technical facts be established before describing the device as a fully verified Rayhunter installation.
IX. WHAT EFF RAYHUNTER IS DESIGNED TO DETECT
Rayhunter analyzes cellular modem signaling for selected conditions that may warrant investigation.
Depending on the software version, supported device, and configured analysis rules, relevant conditions may include:
- Suspicious cellular identity requests.
- Certain abnormal cellular signaling sequences.
- Unexpected network redirection behavior.
- Relevant authentication or encryption anomalies.
- Other conditions addressed by the installed Rayhunter heuristic rules.
An alert or suspicious event identified by such software would require examination of the recorded diagnostic data.
It would not automatically establish that an unlawful cell-site simulator was operating.
A positive heuristic finding would require technical review to distinguish a suspicious condition from legitimate cellular-network behavior or a false positive.
Rayhunter is not designed to establish the identity of an apartment resident, detect unauthorized Apple Screen Time passcode changes, or prove that an iPhone has been cloned.
X. RAYHUNTER AND CELLULAR-NETWORK OBSERVATION LIMITATIONS
Rayhunter monitors information available through the supported device's cellular modem.
It does not provide unrestricted visibility into every nearby telephone or wireless device.
It does not automatically determine that a neighboring person possesses an unauthorized copy of my cellular credentials.
It also does not independently establish that an Apple Account has been compromised.
A potential IMSI-catcher observation and an Apple Screen Time problem are separate technical issues.
Any proposed relationship between them would require additional evidence demonstrating an actual connection.
XI. OCTOBER 17 — REPORTED IPHONE CONNECTION TO THE ORBIC
After becoming concerned about the Screen Time passcode discrepancy, I connected my iPhone 17 to the Verizon Orbic RC400L Wi-Fi network.
My stated purpose was to examine the hotspot's connection status and determine whether any unexpected wireless clients were present.
I expected my iPhone 17 to be the only device connected to the Orbic Wi-Fi network during the relevant period.
I also intended to use the device in connection with my previously described cellular-network monitoring configuration.
These purposes are based on my personal account of the actions I performed.
XII. EXHIBIT A2 — IPHONE WI-FI SETTINGS
Exhibit A2 depicts my Apple iPhone Settings interface.
The displayed Wi-Fi network name is:
Verizon-RC400L-7E
The screenshot also displays:
- Personal Hotspot — Off.
- VPN — Not Connected.
- Bluetooth — On.
- Airplane Mode — Off.
The screenshot documents the displayed configuration of those settings.
It does not independently identify all devices connected to the Orbic.
It also does not establish that cellular surveillance or unauthorized remote administration occurred.
XIII. APPROXIMATELY 1:32 P.M. — REPORTED HOTSPOT CLIENT-COUNT CONCERN
At approximately 1:32 p.m., I examined the Verizon Orbic RC400L.
I report observing information suggesting that two devices were connected when I expected only one connected Wi-Fi client, my iPhone 17.
I did not knowingly authorize an unfamiliar second client.
I considered the reported difference concerning and wanted to establish whether any unknown device was associated with the hotspot.
However, the submitted Exhibit A1 photograph does not visibly show a connected-client count of two.
For evidentiary purposes, the observation remains my reported recollection pending review of the device's connected-client interface or other available records.
Even if two clients were connected, that fact alone would not establish that my iPhone was mirrored, cloned, or controlled remotely.
XIV. EXHIBIT A1 — ORBIC DEVICE DISPLAY
Exhibit A1 depicts the Verizon Orbic RC400L.
The device screen visibly displays:
NO SERVICE
and:
Retrieving data usage info
The photograph shows the device's service-status interface.
It does not display a Rayhunter detection report, cellular-network diagnostic capture, confirmed IMSI-catcher alert, or connected-client inventory.
The "NO SERVICE" message may reflect an absence of active cellular service or another network-registration condition.
It does not establish that unauthorized cellular interception occurred.
Similarly, the message about retrieving data usage information does not establish the existence of an unauthorized network client.
The operating condition of the hotspot should be determined through direct technical examination.
XV. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HOTSPOT CLIENT COUNT AND CELL-SITE SIMULATOR DETECTION
A Wi-Fi client count and a Rayhunter cellular-network analysis result measure different things.
The Wi-Fi client count concerns devices associated with the hotspot's local wireless network.
Rayhunter's analysis concerns selected cellular signaling processed by the hotspot's modem.
Therefore, an increase from one Wi-Fi client to two, if verified, would be a local-network observation.
It would not constitute a positive Rayhunter finding.
Likewise, a Rayhunter alert would not automatically establish that an unauthorized second Wi-Fi client existed.
The two records should not be substituted for one another during technical or legal review.
XVI. APPROXIMATELY 1:44 P.M. — SCREEN TIME PASSCODE CONFIGURATION
At approximately 1:44 p.m., I returned to the Screen Time passcode interface.
I report that I needed to use the recovery process to establish a Screen Time credential that I could control.
I retained a screenshot labeled Exhibit B1.
The image shows an Apple interface requesting the old Screen Time passcode and offering a recovery option.
The visible interface itself does not show an incorrect-passcode error or the digits entered.
XVII. EXHIBIT B1 — OLD PASSCODE ENTRY SCREEN
Exhibit B1 displays:
"Enter Screen Time Passcode"
"Enter old Screen Time passcode"
and:
"Forgot Passcode?"
I report that I used the available recovery option because of my continuing difficulty with the credential configuration.
The screenshot establishes that the old-passcode entry interface was displayed.
It does not independently show that the passcode XXXX or XXXX was entered or rejected at that moment.
The precise preceding user interaction would require additional contemporaneous records to establish.
XVIII. EXHIBIT B2 — SCREEN TIME PASSCODE RECOVERY
Exhibit B2 displays the Screen Time Passcode Recovery interface.
The screen requests authentication through the Apple Account associated with Screen Time recovery.
My Apple Account email address is visible in the original image.
I report that I used my Apple Account credentials to proceed with recovery.
The screenshot is consistent with entry into Apple's standard account-based Screen Time recovery process.
It does not show that a third party had access to my password.
The original image contains personal account information and should be maintained as confidential evidence.
XIX. EXHIBIT B3 — NEW SCREEN TIME PASSCODE ENTRY
Exhibit B3 displays:
"Enter Screen Time Passcode"
"Enter new Screen Time passcode"
The interface provides four passcode positions.
I report that I entered a newly selected four-digit Screen Time credential.
The numerical value is not visible in the exhibit.
This image supports that the new-credential entry stage was presented.
XX. EXHIBIT B4 — CONFIRMATION OF NEW SCREEN TIME PASSCODE
Exhibit B4 displays:
"Enter Screen Time Passcode"
"Re-enter new Screen Time passcode"
This image documents the confirmation stage.
I report that I completed the credential-confirmation process.
The screenshot itself does not show the final accepted credential or independently verify that the setup process had completed at the instant of capture.
XXI. APPROXIMATELY 1:51 P.M. — REPORTED SUCCESSFUL CREDENTIAL CHANGE
At approximately 1:51 p.m., I report successfully completing the process of establishing another Screen Time passcode.
I personally selected this credential.
I did not knowingly authorize another person to establish it on my behalf.
The newly established four-digit value has not been provided for inclusion in this report.
Consequently, it is identified as:
[OCTOBER 17 FINAL SCREEN TIME PASSCODE — NOT DISCLOSED]
No numerical value is inferred from the screenshots.
XXII. EXHIBIT B5 — SCREEN TIME PASSCODE ACTIVITY
Exhibit B5 displays Apple's Screen Time settings.
The section labeled "Manage Screen Time" contains the following statement:
Passcode used today at 1:52 PM
The screenshot's status bar displays 2:18.
The 1:52 p.m. value documents the time of passcode activity reported by the interface.
The 2:18 value is the time displayed on the device when the screenshot was captured.
These timestamps must not be treated as interchangeable.
The screenshot is consistent with passcode activity shortly after my reported completion of the configuration process.
It does not independently establish who entered an earlier credential or who changed the credential before recovery.
XXIII. EXHIBIT C1 — APPLE ACCOUNT SETTINGS AND FAMILY SHARING
Exhibit C1 displays the Apple Account settings interface.
It includes the option:
"Family — Set Up"
I report that I have not enrolled family members through Apple's Family Sharing feature.
The displayed setting supports that the Family feature was presented as not configured.
However, Family Sharing is not equivalent to the Apple Account's complete signed-in device list.
The screenshot therefore does not independently establish that only my iPhone 17 was signed into the account.
It also does not determine whether account sessions were authorized.
XXIV. QUESTION OF WHETHER AN UNKNOWN PERSON KNEW MY APPLE ACCOUNT PASSWORD
I am concerned that an unknown person may have obtained my Apple Account credentials.
This concern arises in part from the recurring Screen Time problems and the fact that I changed my Apple Account password at approximately 12:45 p.m. on October 17.
An important chronological distinction exists:
My reported Screen Time discrepancy occurred at approximately 12:34 p.m.
My Apple Account password change occurred afterward, at approximately 12:45 p.m.
Therefore, the existence of the earlier discrepancy does not establish that an unknown person knew the password I subsequently selected.
I also personally entered Apple's Screen Time recovery process.
That activity can explain why the Apple Account recovery interface appeared on my own device without requiring another person to possess my credentials.
I request investigation of actual account activity rather than presuming unauthorized password knowledge.
XXV. REQUEST FOR APPLE ACCOUNT AND SCREEN TIME RECORDS
Where available and lawfully accessible, I request preservation and verification of:
- Apple Account password-change records for October 17.
- Security notifications relating to the change.
- Trusted devices associated with the account.
- Trusted telephone numbers.
- Available Apple Account sign-in or authentication activity.
- Screen Time configuration changes.
- Screen Time recovery activity.
- Family Sharing status.
- Configuration profiles and device-management enrollment.
- Relevant account-recovery activity.
- Changes to security settings during the incident period.
- Any identifiable account activity originating from a device I do not recognize.
I understand that Apple may not make all requested records available to individual account holders.
XXVI. REQUEST FOR VERIZON ORBIC AND RAYHUNTER RECORDS
I request examination of the Orbic RC400L and, if installed, Rayhunter's diagnostic and configuration records.
Relevant information includes:
- Actual Wi-Fi client count at the relevant time.
- Connected-device names and available identifiers.
- Local IP-address assignments.
- Wi-Fi connection and disconnection history, if recorded.
- Cellular registration and service status.
- Rayhunter installed version and application status.
- Confirmation that the Rayhunter process was operational.
- Available Rayhunter alert or heuristic-analysis records.
- Relevant cellular diagnostic captures.
- Applicable configuration settings and log timestamps.
- Device clock and timezone configuration.
- Any available software installation or update records.
If a Rayhunter alert was generated, the underlying diagnostic information should be examined by a qualified technical reviewer before interpreting the alert as evidence of a cell-site simulator.
XXVII. REQUEST FOR VERIZON ACCOUNT AND CELLULAR SERVICE VERIFICATION
Because I have separately reported telecommunications-account security concerns, I request review of relevant Verizon account information where available.
This may include:
- SIM and eSIM provisioning events.
- Authorized devices associated with my cellular account.
- Carrier-account authentication activity.
- Device activation history.
- Number-transfer or port-out requests.
- Available service and account modification records.
- Changes in account security settings.
- Any technically verified duplicate provisioning or registration.
A second hotspot Wi-Fi client, if confirmed, does not by itself demonstrate a duplicate SIM, eSIM, or telephone number.
These issues require distinct technical evidence.
XXVIII. RELATIONSHIP TO PREVIOUS SCREEN TIME INCIDENTS
I previously documented Screen Time credential irregularities on other dates, including October 8, 2026.
The October 17 report is a separate incident record.
The recurrence makes it appropriate to examine device configuration, account settings, synchronization, authentication history, and software behavior.
However, recurring Screen Time difficulties do not establish that the same external person caused each incident.
I request that comparisons with prior incidents be based on recorded technical similarities rather than presumed association.
XXIX. OCTOBER 14–17, 2026 CHRONOLOGY
Date / Approximate Time | Event |
October 14, 6:14 p.m. | I intentionally establish Screen Time passcode XXXX |
October 17, 12:34 p.m. | I report discovering a Screen Time discrepancy associated with passcode XXXX |
October 17, 12:45 p.m. | I intentionally change my Apple Account/iCloud password |
October 17, approximately 1:32 p.m. | I examine the Orbic and report concern about a possible second Wi-Fi client |
October 17, approximately 1:44 p.m. | I enter the Screen Time old-passcode interface and proceed toward recovery |
October 17, approximately 1:48 p.m. | Screen Time recovery interface displayed |
October 17, approximately 1:49 p.m. | New-passcode entry and confirmation interfaces displayed |
October 17, approximately 1:51 p.m. | I report successfully establishing another Screen Time passcode |
October 17, 1:52 p.m. | Screen Time later reports passcode activity at this time |
October 17, 2:18 p.m. | Time displayed on the screenshot showing Screen Time settings |
The times associated with my actions are reported from recollection unless separately identified as visible interface timestamps.
XXX. CONSOLIDATED EXHIBIT INDEX
Exhibit | Description | Evidentiary purpose |
A1 | Verizon Orbic RC400L displaying "NO SERVICE" | Documents device service-status message |
A2 | iPhone Wi-Fi settings displaying Verizon-RC400L-7E | Documents displayed Wi-Fi network |
B1 | Screen Time old-passcode interface | Documents old-credential prompt and recovery option |
B2 | Screen Time Passcode Recovery | Documents Apple Account recovery interface |
B3 | New Screen Time passcode entry | Documents new-credential entry stage |
B4 | New Screen Time passcode confirmation | Documents re-entry stage |
B5 | Screen Time activity shown as 1:52 p.m. | Documents displayed passcode activity |
C1 | Apple Account settings showing Family — Set Up | Documents visible Family Sharing setting |
Additional Records Requested
D1 — Requested: October 14 Screen Time credential-change confirmation, if available.
D2 — Requested: October 17 Apple Account password-change confirmation.
D3 — Requested: Apple Account trusted-device information.
D4 — Requested: Verizon Orbic connected-client inventory.
D5 — Requested: Rayhunter installation and application-version evidence.
D6 — Requested: Rayhunter diagnostic captures and heuristic-analysis records.
D7 — Requested: Relevant Verizon cellular-account activity records.
D8 — Requested: Any available device or account diagnostic findings concerning the Screen Time discrepancy.
These records are requested evidence, not documents presently authenticated as having been obtained.
XXXI. EVIDENTIARY LIMITATIONS
The supplied exhibits establish that:
- A Verizon Orbic displayed a "NO SERVICE" message.
- An iPhone displayed the Verizon-RC400L-7E Wi-Fi network name.
- Apple Screen Time presented an old-passcode prompt.
- Apple displayed its Screen Time recovery interface.
- New-passcode entry and confirmation screens appeared.
- Screen Time reported passcode activity at 1:52 p.m.
- Apple Account settings displayed Family — Set Up.
They do not independently establish:
- Who caused the reported October 17 credential discrepancy.
- Whether an unknown person changed the passcode.
- Whether another individual obtained my Apple Account password.
- Whether two Wi-Fi clients were connected.
- Whether any additional client was unauthorized.
- Whether Rayhunter was operational at the time.
- Whether Rayhunter detected a cell-site simulator.
- Whether my iPhone was cloned or mirrored.
- Whether any neighboring resident or unrelated person accessed my Apple Account.
The unresolved issues require independent evidence.
XXXII. PRESERVATION OF ORIGINAL EVIDENCE
I request preservation of the original photographs and screenshots.
Where practical, evidence records should retain:
- Original filename.
- File creation timestamp.
- File modification timestamp.
- Image resolution.
- Available metadata.
- SHA-256 hash.
- Description of the depicted interface.
- Time shown on the screenshot.
- Date on which the screenshot was examined.
Original files should remain unchanged.
Any redacted, annotated, or publicly distributed copy should be maintained separately.
XXXIII. CONFIDENTIALITY OF AUTHENTICATION CREDENTIALS
The four-digit historical Screen Time values XXXX and XXXX are included in this private report at my express request.
They are not necessary for most public reporting purposes.
Any version prepared for public distribution should redact all Screen Time passcodes, Apple Account credentials, authentication codes, recovery information, and other sensitive account identifiers.
The currently established passcode should remain confidential.
The original Exhibit B2 also contains an Apple Account email address and should not be distributed publicly without appropriate redaction.
XXXIV. REQUEST FOR INDEPENDENT TECHNICAL ATTRIBUTION
I request that any competent technical reviewer determine, where possible:
- Whether the Screen Time configuration changed after October 14.
- Whether a synchronization or software condition affected credential acceptance.
- What account-security events occurred on October 17.
- Whether another device accessed the Apple Account without authorization.
- Whether the hotspot actually had two Wi-Fi clients.
- Whether an unidentified client can be established through available records.
- Whether Rayhunter was installed and functioning.
- Whether any genuine Rayhunter alerts or diagnostic captures exist for the incident period.
- Whether the reported hotspot service-status message reflected ordinary cellular-registration conditions.
- Whether any technical evidence establishes a relationship among these separate concerns.
No responsible person or mechanism should be identified without supporting evidence.
XXXV. NO FINAL LEGAL OR TECHNICAL CONCLUSION
This report documents my observations, retained evidence, and concerns about personal device and account security.
The available exhibits do not independently establish unauthorized computer access, Apple Account compromise, cellular cloning, deliberate Screen Time credential modification by another person, or unlawful cellular surveillance.
The involvement of any particular neighboring resident, computer user, telecommunications employee, or other person remains unverified.
The objective of this report is preservation of an accurate record and a request for appropriate technical review.
XXXVI. DECLARATION OF ACCURACY
I, Sarai Hannah Ajai, declare that this report accurately reflects my recollection of the October 14 and October 17, 2026 incidents, my actions involving my Apple iPhone 17 and Apple Account, and my observations concerning the Verizon Orbic RC400L.
I personally report establishing Screen Time passcode XXXX on October 14, experiencing a discrepancy associated with passcode XXXX on October 17, changing my Apple Account password, examining the Orbic device, initiating Screen Time recovery, and establishing another Screen Time passcode.
I further report having previously used or configured the Orbic in connection with the EFF Rayhunter project.
Where the available documentation does not independently verify a reported technical condition, that limitation has been identified.
I request an objective review of relevant account, device, network, and diagnostic records.
Prepared by:
Sarai Hannah Ajai
Complainant
Primary Incident Date: October 17, 2026
Report Preparation Date: October 17, 2026
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